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Escape from Leviathan1 (EfL) is a first attempt at explaining a somewhat complex philosophical theory 
of libertarianism. The theory is far from being as clear as it has subsequently become possible to make 
it.2 Consequently, most reviews have misunderstood it to varying degrees. What is striking is the great 
confidence with which some of these reviews assume they have completely understood it and refuted 
it. This is odd because it does not seem entirely reasonable to suppose that EfL’s errors are quite as 
obvious and naïve as the reviews often assume. And only a slightly more careful reading of the text 
might have disabused them of their misapprehensions. With the article about to be discussed, we have 
another clear example of this phenomenon. But what is particularly interesting about it is that it does 
not itself fully understand the basic conception of liberty that most libertarians assume. And as this is, 
strangely, not that uncommon even among libertarian philosophers, it is certainly worth responding to 
as clearly as possible. 
This essay, then, is a response to an article3 (the reply) that discusses the “nature of liberty” as 
it is theorised in EfL versus how that article prefers to explain it. The reply offers criticism from a point 
of view that may be called ‘the zero-sum conception of social liberty’: where conflicting actions or 
outcomes, etc., are possible, whatever one person has the liberty to do or have, etc., is exactly matched 
by the lack of liberty of other people. This is more or less a Hobbesian conception of liberty instead of 
a Lockean conception. Therefore, a potential murder-victim restricts the liberty of the would-be 
murderer merely by exercising his liberty to run away from him in self-defence. And so we have to 
decide which liberty is to be preferred; thereby making morals or values necessary to solve this problem. 
For a self-described ‘libertarian’ text to assume this view is for it to fail to understand both the first 
thing about libertarianism, or classical liberalism generally, and the probable illiberal consequences of 
its proffered alternative. It should be noted immediately that libertarian holders of this view often 
understand the second to the myriadth thing about libertarianism. So, why do they take the position that 
they do? Perhaps they see the theoretical problems with Lockean liberty (e.g., how can liberty itself 
imply certain types of property and rule out others?) while Hobbesian liberty seems to be both common 
sense and very clear. 
What is said about Rawls’s theory in the preamble seems roughly right (at least, after correcting 
for the apparent confusions over ‘A’ and ‘B’ countries and equality/inequality). When the reply arrives 
at EfL’s conception of liberty it is far less precise than it needs to be. EfL’s position is expressed 
approximately along the lines that, as the reply puts it, “minimising costs is libertarianism; that liberty 
is an absence of imposed costs, and so maximising liberty is minimising costs”. To be more exact, 
however, EfL’s position is about “initiated” imposed costs (which word does appear in the very first 
quotation of EfL in the reply) or proactively imposed costs (as has been preferred since the book was 
published). The initiated or proactive aspect is crucial and makes things much clearer, as we shall see. 
The reply heartily endorses the first sentence of the chapter on liberty: “The classical liberal, 
libertarian, and principal commonsense conception of interpersonal liberty is of people not having 
constraints imposed upon them by other people” (and quotes it four times in all). It can endorse this 
sentence precisely because it omits to mention the “initiated” (or proactive) aspect of those imposed 
constraints (mentioned in the, also quoted, second sentence of that chapter). Had the zero-sum 
alternative been considered at the time of writing the first sentence, the missing word might have been 
explicitly included rather than merely expected to be understood (at least, after reading the second 
sentence). For the first thing to understand about libertarianism is that it is about some sense of people 
not initiating unwanted constraints on each other. To react to an initiated unwanted constraint—e.g., in 
order to prevent it or rectify it—is not itself to initiate an unwanted constraint. 
 
1 Lester, J. C. Escape from Leviathan: Libertarianism Without Justificationism (Buckingham: The University of 
Buckingham Press, [2000] 2012).  
2 For a more recent and clearer explanation see Lester, J. C. 2021. “Eleutheric-Conjectural Libertarianism: a 
Concise Philosophical Explanation”, PhilPapers (https://philpapers.org/rec/INDNLA). 




The reply goes on to ask, “But what does this have to do with costs? Why is ‘not having a 
subjective cost [proactively] imposed on you’ the same as not being [illiberally] constrained?” This 
requires a two-part answer. First, there is an abstract and falsifiable theory (not definition) of 
interpersonal liberty in EfL. But that one abstract theory of liberty is expressed in two different ways 
that are explained to be equivalent (although a sound criticism could fault that explanation). To 
paraphrase EfL slightly, these equivalent expressions are as follows: ‘the absence of initiated 
interpersonal constraints on want-satisfaction’ and ‘no proactively imposed costs’. The latter 
formulation is partly for useful brevity but also because it helps to relate the theory of liberty to 
economics in various ways and to the preference-utilitarian conception of welfare (not to the moral 
theory). 
The reply does not accept, or maybe does not understand, this equivalence as it is briefly 
explained in EfL (pp. 58-59). Instead, it argues that, 
 
I can have costs place[d] on me without there being constraints placed on me. For instance, if I am deeply opposed 
to the colour blue, and you come along wearing a blue shirt, then I have had a cost imposed on me. But [i]n what 
way have I had a constraint imposed on me? 
 
This is taking the words out of their theoretical context and thereby misunderstanding the relevant 
categories of “cost” and “constraint”. As we have now seen, a cost that is proactively imposed on you 
is thereby—as an explained equivalent—an initiated constraint on your want-satisfaction. It ought also 
to be noted in passing that there is a distinction between pre-propertarian (act libertarianism) and 
propertarian (rule libertarianism) applications of EfL’s theory of liberty. However, we can probably best 
assume here that we have passed the stage of deriving self-ownership and private property from 
applying liberty. Consequently, if the owner of the property in question allows blue shirts, then you 
chose to accept that dread possibility when you entered his property. You have had no cost proactively 
imposed on you when a blue shirt hoves into view. This is despite the fact that the blue shirt is indeed 
a cost, as opposed to a benefit, to you. Not all costs are proactively imposed costs. 
The reply continues: 
 
Likewise, I can have constraints imposed upon me without having costs imposed on me. For instance, suppose 
that I am sitting in a room I have no intention of leaving, and, unbeknownst to me, someone comes along and 
locks the door, and then opens it an hour later. During that time, I was constrained to stay in that room (assume it 
had no other exit), prevented and unfree to leave it. This fact imposed no cost on me, though. 
 
Assume you would have objected to being locked in (probably because you would have wished to be 
able to leave if you were to have so chosen, such as in the event of some emergency). Assume also that 
there is no true libertarian explanation for the person choosing to lock you in (e.g., it is somehow to 
prevent a likely proactive imposition by you, or it is to rectify for a past one by you). Then, to be locked 
into the room is an initiated constraint on your want-satisfaction. But this is also, by the explained 
equivalence, a proactively imposed cost. Similarly, someone both initiates constraints on your want-
satisfaction and thereby proactively imposes costs on you if he covertly borrows money from your 
wallet but returns it before you require it, or if he borrows batteries from your smoke alarm but returns 
them—without using them—before there is any fire in your house. In each of these three cases, the 
initiated constraint on your want-satisfaction (or the proactively imposed cost) is a risk at your expense 
that you did not consent to and would have rejected if asked.4 
Therefore, contra what the reply concludes, proactively imposed costs (in the sense 
theoretically explained) are necessary and sufficient features of illiberal constraints. Of course, most 
people will not recognise or understand this abstract formulation as their sense; but it is entailed by their 
general conception. Steiner, Spencer, and Tucker also require this conception. Being in the muddled 
minority of zero-sumers, like the reply, they have not understood that being against initiated constraints 
 
4 Thus, your ‘wants’ (or preferences) need not be explicit and conscious. Someone need not be thinking “I want 
not to be shot” for a sudden shooting of him to count as flouting what he wants to be done to him. Similarly, we 




on want-satisfaction (or proactively imposed costs) just is the abstract interpersonal conception of 
liberty. 
So, in response to the reply’s three concluding points: 
1. It is, by EfL’s equivalence-explanation, not possible to initiate constraints on want-
satisfaction without also proactively imposing costs; and vice versa. Therefore, “liberty is the absence 
of [proactively] imposed cost” and “[maximally] observing liberty entails minimizing [proactively] 
imposed costs” do work as formulations of “The classical liberal, libertarian, and principal 
commonsense conception of interpersonal liberty [as] people not having [initiated] constraints imposed 
upon them by other people”. 
2. EfL does not assert that libertarians and classical liberals explicitly “think of liberty in terms 
of an absence of [proactively] imposed costs, and think of maximising liberty as minimising proactively 
imposed costs”. The assertion is that this theory is an explicit version of the tacit conception that is 
presupposed or entailed by libertarianism. 
3. The zero-sum view is not “closer to” but, rather, inconsistent with the “absence of [initiated] 
constraints [on want-satisfaction] imposed by other people”.  
If one embraces zero-sum liberty instead, it can only set up conflicts among people. The reply’s 
appeal to contractarianism is unlikely to get us out of this. For one thing, contractarianism apparently 
entails that one can do anything to people as long as they would ‘theoretically’ (probably depending on 
who is theorising) contract into that possibility. But the main problem is that whatever things the state 
coerces people into accepting, they are conceptually disallowed from complaining that these are real 
restrictions on overall interpersonal liberty. For all social rules—whatever they are—must allow exactly 
as much zero-sum liberty as they limit it. There is no line that it is inherently ‘unlibertarian’ to cross. 
Thus, this zero-sum ‘liberty’ is a gift to statists. Such things as promoting welfare must be debated 
instead. Although libertarians typically think we win on those grounds as well, it does not help our case 
if we are conceptually disallowed from using the crucial and basic liberal idea of liberty as not having 
to suffer initiated constraints by other people, and argue that flouting just such liberty is overwhelmingly 
what destroys welfare. With the zero-sum view, ‘liberty’ is a vacuity that can play no role at all in 
determining and stating what is ‘libertarian’. 
Consider what the reply finally says: 
 
It may be, for instance, that there is a particular distribution, or original distribution, of freedom that it would be 
rational for everybody to agree to. That would be a contractarian method of distributing freedom. 
 
Because it is zero-sum here, the word “freedom” qua freedom has no substantive content whatsoever. 
It could more naturally and informatively be replaced by ‘resources’, or ‘valuable opportunities’, or 
even ‘utility’, or whatever else takes one’s fancy. Of course, zero-sumers want the sorts of outcomes 
that are normally understood as being ‘libertarian’. But by replacing a substantive Lockean conception 
of liberty with a vacuous Hobbesian conception they are, unwittingly, philosophically undermining the 
very outcomes they seek to promote. 
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